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Kaufman: Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
set forth terms detailing the precise responsibilities
of the parties as well as specify how the manuscripts will be published. Q

Rhonda L. Lorenz
1. The contract read,"[t]he Author will deliver to the Publisher on a mutually agreeable date one copy of the manuscript
of the Work as finally arranged by the editor and satisfactory to
the Publisher in form and content." Wildenstein v. Wallis, 578
N.E.2d 981, 982 (Ill. 1991).
2. The contract read,"[w]ithin a reasonable time and a
mutually agreeable date after delivery of the final revised manuscript, the Publisher will publish the Work at its own expense,
in such style and manner and at such price as it deems best, and
will keep the Work in print as long as it deems it expedient; but
it will not be responsible for delays caused by circumstances
beyond its control." Id. at 982-983.
3. Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 515
N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ill. 1987).

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
Introduction
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute requiring barroom dancers to wear pasties and G-strings,
thereby overruling the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend.1 The
Supreme Court followed the four-part test of United
States v. O'Brien and found that the statute did not
violate the protection of expression afforded by the
first amendment.2 Although nude dancing was considered expressive conduct, the Supreme Court
found that the statute's incidental limitations on
this form of expression were justified in light of the
substantial and legitimate interests of the state in
3
regulating this conduct.

Facts
Respondents The Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc. and Glen
Theatre, Inc. were adult entertainment businesses
located in South Bend, Indiana. Respondents
sought to present totally nude dancing in their
establishments but were prevented by an Indiana
regulation of public nudity which required dancers
to wear pasties and G- strings. 4 Respondents Miller
and Sutro were dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge
and Glen Theatre, respectively, who, along with the
establishments, contested the validity of the Indiana statute based on the first amendment's protection of expression.
Respondents sued to enjoin the enforcement of the
Indiana statute in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana and prayed for
an injunction. The District Court found the statute
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facially overbroad and granted respondents' injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, finding that respondents' challenge was
precluded by previous statutory litigation, and remanded the case to the District Court in order for
the plaintiffs to pursue their first amendment
claim. The District Court held that the dancing was
not protected and ruled in favor of the defendants.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, in Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, the court held that non-obscene,
nude barroom dancing performed as entertainment
was expressive conduct protected under the first
amendment and that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional as applied.5

Legal Analysis
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether nude dancing was expressive conduct. The
Seventh Circuit asserted that nudity alone does not
preclude material from first amendment protection
and that within the context of communicative expression, "the Constitution leaves matters of taste
and style so largely to the individual." 6 As long as

there exists an intent to convey a specific message
and the message is likely to be understood by the
audience, protection is warranted by the first
amendment. 7 In this case, the Seventh Circuit
found that an emotional message of eroticism and
sensuality was intended by the nude dance and that
the profits from the dance attested to its successful
conveyance."
The Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's determination that the nude dancing involved here was expressive conduct. However, the
Supreme Court asserted that nude dancing was
afforded limited constitutional protection because
this type of conduct was only marginally "within
the outer perimeters of the first amendment. 9
To determine the protection afforded by the first
amendment and the permissive level of governmental restriction on symbolic speech, the Supreme Court applied the four-part test used in
United States v. O'Brien. O'Brien held that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it
is within the government's constitutional power; (2)
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) it is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and (4) the least restrictive means
is used to further that interest.10
The state asserted, and the Supreme Court accepted, that Indiana may constitutionally exercise
its police powers by enacting a statute to promote
the health, safety, and morals of its citizens. The
Supreme Court held that Indiana's long history of
bans on public nudity was proof of the legitimacy of
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